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CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR. By Bruce A. Ackerman and William T.
Hassler. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. x,
193. $5.95.
In the early 1970s, Congress enacted a host of statutes that required the expenditure of billions of dollars for environmental protection. Although the jury is still out on the effectiveness of this
legislation, recent events indicate that at least a preliminary assessment is in order, perhaps with an eye to procedural reform. Bruce
Ackerman and William Hassler's reflections on the Clean Air Act of
1970 1 should thus spark considerable interest. In Clean Coal/.Dirty
Air, they examine the regulation of coal-fired power plants, and find
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Congress, and the
courts have mishandled a critical environmental issue. In particular,
the authors charge, the EPA's 1979 air pollution standards were so
ineptly drafted "that some of the nation's most populous areas will
end up with a worse environment than would have resulted if the
new policy had never been put into effect" (p. 2). The regulations
often require the use of scrubbers,2 even when cheaper options are
readily available, and ''will cost the public tens of billions of dollars
to achieve environmental goals that could be reached more cheaply,
more quickly, and more surely by other means" (p. 2).
Ackerman and Hassler, however, are concerned more with "serious breakdowns in the administrative process"3 than with the substantive merits of a particular agency decision. They contend that
congressional efforts in the 1970s to reduce the EPA's discretion - a
process that they call moving beyond the New Deal - prevented
effective implementation of the Clean Air Act. They conclude that
the Act in its present form is a failure, but suggest that steps can be
taken to improve both the Act and administrative lawmaking
generally.
From the beginning of the New Deal until the late 1960s, Ackerman and Hassler note, administrative agencies were enormously independent. Congress recognized its incompetence to deal
I. Pub. L. No. 90-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. "Scrubbers" are complex devices that remove sulfur from coal-fire smoke as it passes
through a smokestack.
3. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New .Deal· Reply, 90 YALE L.J. 1412, 1412 (1981).
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thoroughly with technical subjects and provided agencies with only
general policy guidelines. The model New Deal agency was substantially "insul~t[ed] from central political control ... [and] from
judicial oversight" (pp. 5-6).4 Judicial review centered on the question of whether an agency had fully analyzed a problem before rendering its decision rather than on the decision itself; only if the
decision was "arbitrary and capricious" would courts second-guess
the substantive determinations of agency policy-makers.
By the time that concern for the environment surfaced in the late
1960s, the style of expert agency policy-making developed during the
New Deal had become unpopular. Many observers believed that
agency officials were opportunistic lawyers rather than dedicated experts, and that agency independence served primarily to conceal the
"capture" of agencies by special interest groups (p. 7). Congress,
under pressure to reform the administrative process, responded with
what the authors term an "agency-forcing statute" (p. 3) - one that
sharply curtailed the agency's discretion. The 1970 Act specifically
instructed the EPA to set quantitative clean air standards that were
to be reached by 1977. The Act, moreover, "presumed to specify the
means of achieving clean air objectives" for new plants (p. 11). Congressional directives gave statutory prominence to technological purification methods in new plants and resulted in decisions that were
made in an "ecological and economic vacuum" (p. 12). In 1977,
Congress went even further,S ignoring the differences in sulfur content between Eastern and Western coal for political reasons and forcing the scrubbing question onto the EPA's agenda.
The book's thesis is that Congress has gone too far beyond the
New Deal. Although the authors concede that Congress is uniquely
equipped to make basic policy choices - and to reconsider those
choices after changes in political opinion (p. 54) - they caution that
Congress is not equipped to conduct expert policy analyses oftechni- •
cal problems. Agencies should thus be empowered and, indeed, required to consider particular problems and to formulate programs
designed to achieve most efficiently the ends specified by Congress.
Only then can we avoid the "Alphonse-Gaston" problem that Ackerman and Hassler identify in the EPA's post-1977 actions:
[O]ne player, Congress, enacts an agency-forcing statute with the expectation that the other player will subject a particular policy to hardheaded consideration. The second player, the agency, thinks that
Congress has already made the policy judgment and narrowly confines
its policy review. Each player allows the other to drop the ball: an
4. Congress, however, was not powerless to deal with agency decisions. Through its appointment and funding powers, Congress could translate sustained shifts in national opinion
into policy changes. For the most part, though, Congress deferred to agencies in technical
areas.
5. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
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important policy is adopted without the hard thinking that should be
required of a sound lawmaking enterprise. [Pp. 104-05.]

The EPA has yet to subject scrubbers to a full inquiry.
To prevent such gaps in the formulation of public policy, Ackerman and Hassler suggest that administrative actions taken under
agency-forcing statutes should be subjected to a more searching level
of judicial review than the traditional "arbitrary and capricious"
standard (p. 105). Applying the "principle of full inquiry" to the
scrubbing controversy, they recommend remanding the 1979 standard to the EPA "for further consideration" (p. 107).6
Those interested in environmental and administrative law will
find Clean Coal/.Dirty Air both thought-provoking and disturbing.
Combined with strict judicial review to ensure agency adherence to
the "principle of full inquiry," agency-forcing statutes may go a long
way toward solving the problems of agency capture that troubled
commentators and Congress in the late 1960s. But the extent to
which politics dominates congressional and administrative policymaking is disheartening, and the authors offer no real solution to this
problem. If our Congressmen read this book7 before rewriting the
Clean Air Act, 8 and we eventually breathe easier, it will be because
the book asks the right questions, not because it gives any answers.

6. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently upheld the EPA's
regulations dealing with emissions from coal-fired plants. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F,2d 298
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
7. A slightly shorter version of this work appeared in the Yale Law Journal before publication as a book. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New J)eal· Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89
YALE LJ. 1466 (1980). See also Smith & Randle, Comment on Beyond the New Deal, 90
YALE LJ. 1398 (1981); Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 2.
8. The rewriting process is underway. See Natl. L.J., Sept. 28, 1981, at 6, col. 4.

